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Earnings management and audit quality: Stakeholders’ perceptions 
Yasser Barghathi, David Collison, and Louise Crawford 
1. Introduction
Perceptions of audit quality have recently been identified as a topical and important issue 
as a result of audit failures and corporate collapse (Kilgore et al., 2014). Calls for 
mandatory audit firm rotation and industry specialist auditors on audit quality have been 
made as a result of high-profile accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom (Firth 
et al., 2012; Kilgore et al., 2014; Anis, 2014; Kim et al., 2015). Auditors are assigned 
primarily to increase confidence that financial statements fairly represent the financial 
position of a firm. Earnings management may distort this "fair presentation" and be a real 
concern to auditors. Moreover, auditors will become more worried when management 
use questionable accounting practices (Jones, 2011). The broader accounting quality 
literature, according to Libby et al. (2015), has identified the importance of the external 
auditor’s role in relation to earnings management practices as a potential monitor that may 
reduce such practices. However, auditors are often seen as trying to balance their wish to 
satisfy the client on one hand and to avoid litigation and regulatory consequences on the 
other hand, as well as being concerned about possible reputational damage.  For Stolowy and 
Breton (2004), auditors are dealing with two important objectives; satisfying the client 
and avoiding risk from third parties.  
This paper examines the perceptions of various stakeholders in relation to audit quality. 
Its primary objective is to capture the experiences of a range of stakeholders in relation to 
the audit quality of Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs) by seeking their perceptions 
regarding the issue of earnings management. This paper investigates whether 
stakeholders' think auditors are able to detect and prevent earnings management practices 
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by LCBs and therefore provide a good quality audit.  Research on audit quality in Libya 
has been relatively limited and calls have been made for more in-depth research on the 
topic (Zakari and Menacere, 2012; Sawan and Alsaqqa, 2013; Sawan and Alzeban, 
2015).  More generally, earnings management is perceived as a challenging issue by the 
financial reporting community due to its negative impact on financial reporting quality 
(Ascioglu et al., 2012: Habbash et al., 2013),  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on earnings management 
and audit quality, including consideration of audit firm rotation and industry 
specialization as steps that may be taken to address concerns.  The section also includes a 
brief overview of the accounting profession and banking audits in Libya. Section 3 
provides the theoretical framework adopted by the paper, and Section 4 describes the 
research methodology. Section 5 discusses the paper’s results; both from interviews and a 
questionnaire survey. Section 6 presents the summary and conclusion.  
2. Literature review 
The following section provides an overview of the literature that explains, first of all, 
what is meant by audit quality and how earnings management can affect it.  The literature 
on two specific approaches to supporting audit quality is also considered, namely; auditor 
rotation and industry specialisation. The focus of this paper is to examine perceptions of 
the audit quality provided to LCBs and so literature pertaining to the regulatory 
framework of accounting in Libya will also be included in this section. 
2.1 EM and Audit quality 
Earnings management has been recognised as an attempt by managers to influence 
financial statements by using specific accounting methods to achieve some self-interested 
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goal (Akers et al. 2007). The external audit, according to Michas (2011), is likely to be 
important in emerging markets where there are no strong legal and financial institutions 
that reduce agency cost, as is arguably the case in Libya. It mitigates the problem of 
information asymmetry (Ojala et al., 2014). In particular, the external auditor plays a 
central role in the deterrence of earnings management behaviour (Cotter, 2012). The 
literature shows that a high quality external audit can have an influential role in reducing 
earnings management practices (Frankel et al., 2002). Audit quality has been defined in 
the literature in various ways and it should be noted that, according to Ojala et al., (2014), 
it is a complex concept that has no single agreed definition. It has been described as the 
raison d'etre of the audit profession since the audit function would be of little or no value 
if it was of doubtful quality (Dickins et al., 2014). Much audit quality research, according 
to Kilgore et al., (2014), draws on DeAngelo's (1981) widely cited definition of audit 
quality that is the auditor's ability to discover and report a breach or misstatement in the 
accounting system or financial statements. Kilgore et al., (2014) report that the literature 
provides two approaches to test for audit quality; the first focuses on the audit process 
outcome e.g. errors made by the auditor resulting in an inappropriate audit opinion and/or 
deficient financial statements,  while the second assesses audit quality from an ex-ante 
perspective. The second approach uses proxies to measure audit quality, e.g. firm size, 
litigation experience, auditor reputation, auditor tenure, non-audit services, audit 
structure, and industry specialisation. However, audit quality based on the second type 
can also be measured by examining the perceptions of individuals who are involved in, or 
affected by the audit (Kilgore et al., 2014). This paper examines audit quality by 
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addressing stakeholders’ perceptions of the ability of the external auditors to detect and 
prevent the practices of earnings management by LCBs’ managers. 
2.2 Auditor firm rotation and audit quality 
It is a “common assumption” that audit firm rotation increases audit quality (Ewelt-
Knauer, 2012, p. 17). However, prior research on auditor independence reveals mixed 
results in regard to the relationship between firm rotation and audit quality. Johnson et al. 
(2002), for example, compared how short audit firm tenure (2-3 years) and medium audit 
firm tenure (4-8 years) would affect the quality of financial reporting. They found that 
short audit firm tenure is associated with lower financial reporting quality. Another study 
by Carcello and Nagy (2004) confirmed the research findings of Johnson et al. (2002). 
They found that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to exist when there is short 
audit firm tenure. Cameran et al. (2008) tested how mandatory audit firm rotation would 
affect audit quality and found that there are no beneficial effects on audit quality as a 
result of mandatory audit firm rotation. Jackson et al. (2008) investigated the effect of 
mandatory audit firm rotation on audit quality in Australia and found that audit quality 
increases with audit firm tenure. They conclude that given the additional costs associated 
with switching auditors there are minimal, if any, benefits of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. They also suggested that regulators should consider other initiatives to address 
concerns about auditor independence and audit quality before imposing mandatory audit 
firm rotation. In Indonesia, it is compulsory to rotate the auditor every 3 years and to 
rotate the audit firm every 5 years. Siregar et al. (2012) tested the effect of this regulation 
on audit quality and found that both auditor and audit firm rotation did not increase audit 
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quality. They concluded that regulators may need to reconsider the regulation in order to 
increase audit quality. 
On the other hand, there are some scholars who are in favour of mandatory audit firm 
rotation. Kramer et al. (2011) examined earnings quality using conservatism as a proxy 
(attribute). Their results indicate that conservatism in reported earnings decreases as the 
tenure of the audit firm lengthens. And as a result, they argued, audit firm rotation may 
have a positive impact on earnings quality. A recent study by Kim et al. (2015) 
investigated whether mandatory audit firm rotation enhances audit quality in Korea. Their 
findings suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation leads to better audit quality compared 
to voluntary audit firm rotation. In Libya, the Central Bank requires that a listed auditor 
can only audit a commercial bank for two consecutive financial years after which the 
auditor has to be rotated. In this limited context, and based on the literature reported 
above, the audit quality provided by listed auditors may be expected to be perceived as of 
good quality.  
2.3 Industry specialization and audit quality 
According to Krishnan (2003), specialist auditors are more likely to detect earnings 
management than non-specialists; they have the required experience and resources and 
are armed with an incentive (to maintain their reputation) to constrain earnings 
management. Ultimately reported earnings quality should therefore be enhanced. Industry 
specialists, according to Dunn and Mayhew (2004), possess the required industry specific 
knowledge and expertise and therefore can play a crucial role in monitoring the financial 
reporting process by providing high quality audit services to clients. Specialist auditors, 
according to Lowensohn et al. (2007), are more likely to detect errors in financial 
5
  
statements than non-specialist auditors. Bruynseels et al., (2011) report that industry 
specialist auditors provide high audit quality and note that industry specialization is 
associated with, among other things, lower levels of earnings management.  Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) documented a positive association between industry specialist auditors 
and accounting quality in unregulated industries. However, they found no relationship in 
regulated industries.  
The effect of auditor industry specialization on earnings management was also 
acknowledged recently by Sun and Liu (2013), who concluded that auditor industry 
specialization complements corporate governance effectively constraining earnings 
management.  
The previously cited literature provides clear evidence of the ability of specialist auditors 
to better detect and prevent earning management practices, compared to non-specialists. 
In Libya, the Central Bank of Libya maintains a list of auditors who are approved to 
undertake bank audits. In order for an auditor to be listed, he/she has to demonstrate 
qualification and relevant experience, among other requirements. This institutional 
feature, i.e. the requirements by the Central Bank of Libya, provide a distinctive setting in 
which to explore perceptions of audit quality. It provides us with a setting where both 
mandatory audit firm rotation and auditor specialization are regulatory features. Such 
institutional features have been used previously in the literature when choosing a 
jurisdiction to test for audit quality, see, for example, Firth et al. (2012).The next two 
sub-sections outline respectively the regulatory frameworks of auditing and accounting in 
Libya; and, in particular, the regulations concerning banking are described.   
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2.4 Auditing in Libya 
The accounting profession in Libya was governed for the first time by Law No. 116 that 
was enacted in 19731,2 by which the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association 
(LAAA) was established. The ability to supply audit services is restricted to LAAA 
members. Membership of the association requires that a candidate is a Libyan who has an 
accounting degree and who has experience of five years in an accountancy-related job 
after gaining their degree (Ahmed and Gao, 2004; Sawan and Alzeban, 2015). This law 
covers many issues relating to accounting practices in the country; the LAAA is the only 
responsible body to act with legal status in the area of auditing on behalf the State; 
moreover it “manages every facet of the auditing profession” (Ritchie and Khorwatt, 
2007, p. 41). Ahmed and Gao (2004) summarised the objectives of the law as follows: 
“(i) to organise and improve the conditions of the accounting profession and 
to raise the standards of accountants and auditors professionally, 
academically, culturally and politically; (ii) to organise and participate in 
conferences and seminars related to accounting internally and externally and 
to keep in touch with new events, scientific periodicals, lectures and so on; 
(iii) to establish a retirement pension fund for its members; (v) to increase 
co-operation between its members and to protect their rights; and (vi) to 
take action against members who violate the tradition and ethics of the 
profession” (p. 369). 
 
However, Mahmud and Russell (2003) concluded that the LAAA had failed to achieve 
important objectives; for example, to establish or participate in research, conferences, and 
seminars or any activity that may have an influence over the profession’s development. It 
                                                 
1 Before 1952 when Libya gained its independence, there was no national accounting body nor accounting 
firms, business firms at that time were served by foreign accounting firms from Italy and UK (Ahmed and 
Gao, 2004). 
2 During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the accounting firms which worked in Libya were either British or 
American; Libyan accounting firms have existed only since 1970 (Mahmud and Russell, 2003). 
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had, according to Mahmud and Russell (2003), failed even to regulate itself, let alone 
pursue its responsibility towards the public interest. Another critique of the LAAA by 
Mahmud and Russell (2003) was that the LAAA did not yet have a code of ethics. 
In addition to the above critiques, Mahmud (1997) pointed out that the LAAA has failed 
to either organise or participate in any programmes that would develop the profession; in 
addition it was, at that time, unsuccessful in updating the profession about recent 
developments. He concluded based on the above, that the accounting profession in Libya 
was very weak3. El-Firjani (2010) concluded that the LAAA had had no real impact on 
the accounting profession in Libya, and, in particular, that it had failed to develop 
accounting practices. He added that accounting practices in Libya are mainly dependent 
on statutory regulations. However, it is worth noting that the LAAA attempted in 2006 to 
prepare national accounting standards by issuing the first Exposure Draft of a number of 
Libyan Accounting Standards (EDLASs). This draft consisted of 29 accounting standards 
mainly based on IFRS/IAS. However, due to weakness in the enforcement system, this 
draft is still not mandatory (El-Firjani, 2010). The accounting profession, according to El-
Firjani (2010), is still immature as it is in the early stages of developing accounting 
practices. Moreover, a shortcoming of the LAAA, according to Sawan and Alezban 
(2015), is that it has not undertaken any classification of Libyan audit firms in terms of 
the number of staff, revenue, and resources. Such information could be of great interest in 
audit quality research in Libya. 
Accounting practices in Libya have been influenced by a number of factors, one of which 
is the accounting education system (Mahmud and Russell, 2003); in this and other aspects 
                                                 
3 This situation still remains the case, and it may of course be even worse. As with other Libyan 
institutions, the LAAA is having to cope with the disruption caused by the Libyan revolution and its 
aftermath.   
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it has been influenced by Western accounting since “applied accounting principles and 
auditing standards in Libya follow those of the U.K. and the U.S” (Mahmud and Russell, 
2003. p. 201)4. Another factor that may have had an influence over the accounting 
profession in Libya as identified by Ahmed and Gao (2004) is the discovery of oil. Since 
the late 1950s, when oil was discovered, the development of economic activities in Libya 
has resulted in more reliable accounting information becoming required for many users 
including management, investors, and government (El-Firjani, 2010). 
2.5 The Libyan Commercial Banks Audit 
The quality of the external audit is unobservable, however it can arguably be measured to 
some extent by, inter alia, auditor tenure (Piot and Janin, 2007). Libyan Commercial 
Banks are subject to supervision by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) according to 
Banking Law no. 1 of 2005. The CBL, according to Article 71, is responsible for 
monitoring and controlling all commercial banks that operate within the country. 
Moreover, interrelationships between commercial banks are also monitored by the CBL. 
The law also contains articles that affect the accounting practices and financial reporting 
of the commercial banks. In Article 73, for example, a commercial bank must retain a 
capital reserve to which no less than 25% of net profit has to be transferred until it 
reaches 50% of the capital; afterwards 10% of the net profit is to be transferred each year 
to the reserve. Every commercial bank has to appoint two external auditors for its 
                                                 
4 The accounting education system was primarily based on UK and US systems; therefore, it is logical that 
the accounting profession is influenced by both UK and US practices. Practitioners are the products of the 
education system as emphasised by Ahmed and Gao (2004) who suggest that the educational system is the 
first stage in the qualifying accountants process. 
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financial year audit. These two auditors have to be registered5 with the Central Bank of 
Libya. 
In the Libyan Commercial banks context, the length of an auditor-bank relationship is 
restricted to only two years, which may help to ensure that a high audit quality is being 
conducted (of course there is a counter argument that auditors’ knowledge of the business 
is a positive function of tenure). If the previous auditor is to be reassigned, a cool-off 
period of at least one year has to pass. Firm rotation represents one of the most common 
mechanisms used to increase the auditor's independence which ceteris paribus may be 
expected to increase auditor willingness to challenge, and if necessary report on, earnings 
management (Libby et. al, 2015).  
3. Theoretical framework and research questions 
Much of earnings management research, according to Habbash and Alghamdi (2015), is 
based on statistical methods and only a few studies have addressed the issue using a 
qualitative approach; they argue that such an approach can help to provide a critical 
understanding of the issue. Regulators, for instance, would benefit from the findings of 
such studies; they will "put an accurate interpretation on such findings" (Habbash and 
Alghamdi, 2015, p. 123). 
The findings of this paper are interpreted from an accountability perspective. The paper 
adopts a normative perspective whereby the findings are interpreted in terms of their 
relevance to the accountability mechanism. The objective role of accounting theory, 
according to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), is to “explain and predict accounting 
                                                 
5 Article 82 of the law requires the Central Bank of Libya to maintain a register of external auditors who are 
capable of auditing and inspecting banks’ accounts. 
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practice”. However, the role of accounting theory can, and in the view of this author 
should, be more concerned about how accounting practice can be improved. 
Accountability is arguably something that everyone should respect. Bovens (2007) 
asserts that accountability is a “gold” concept that is widely supported and that is widely 
used in political discourse since it implies transparency and trustworthiness. 
An accountability relationship implies that an accountor should provide an account to the 
accountee in order to discharge his/her accountability; the aim of such a relationship is to 
encourage the accountor to act in accordance with the accountee’s interests. 
Perks (1993) provides a number of elements for an accountability system to perform 
effectively: production of financial information; the audit of accounting information; and 
the publishing of accounting information. The operating commercial banks in Libya are 
required by commercial law as well as banking law to prepare and publish their financial 
statements. According to Article (226) of the Libyan Commercial Law, boards of 
directors of companies have to prepare financial statements including notes. They are 
also required to submit a report highlighting the company's activity during the period. 
Moreover, listed banks have to prepare their accounts according to International Financial 
Reporting Standards (Kribat, 2009). 
The second element of accountability (Perks, 1993) is the audit of accounting 
information. He believes that audited accounting information serves users better than 
unaudited information. The external audit function starts when the accounting process is 
completed; it represents the second stage in the process of holding accountable those 
responsible for the management of an organisation’s finances (White and Hollingsworth, 
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1999). The literature suggests that the external audit process has become an important 
factor within the accountability system based on the nature of the audit process6. 
Moreover, it is argued that auditing activities are the direct result of the need for 
accountability: “accountability is the raison d’etre of auditing activities” (Gong, 2009, p. 
5). He concluded that “audits are able to curtail the [misuse of power] by enhancing 
monitoring and supervision” (p. 6). Audit, according to White and Hollingsworth (1999), 
“provides professionally structured and independent information to a variety of actors in 
the accountability [process]” (p. 9). In this regard, Gong (2009), points out that a poor 
audit system “can leave the door open for irregular and illegal financial behaviors” (p. 6). 
In this context, Laffan (2003) suggests that financial accountability requires external 
auditing; she added that accountability is enhanced by the practice of audit in a 
professional manner as well as by reporting audit findings. 
Article (18) of the Libyan Commercial Law requires every company to appoint a licensed 
auditor to audit its accounts while Article (209) states that an auditor has to issue an 
auditor's report embodying his opinion on a company's accounting affairs; this report has 
to assert the auditor’s opinion as to whether a company's accounts are faithfully presented 
and comply with the law. The auditor's opinion also has to refer to whether accounts have 
been prepared according to the approved accounting standards7.  In terms of commercial 
banks, Banking Law No. 1 of 2005 requires that every bank’s accounts are certified by 
two external auditors. These auditors, according to Article 82 of the law, have to be 
                                                 
6 Some scholars, according to Gong (2009), argue that “auditing has strong anticorruption functions” due to 
the nature of audit work which puts the auditors in a position to uncover and deter potentially illegal or 
immoral behaviour.  
7 The law has not defined what approved accounting standards are. Financial reporting in Libya is largely 
influenced by the legal system; in particular the Libyan mercantile law, income tax law, and banking law 
for commercial banks, are considered to be the most important legal factors that have shaped  accounting 
practices in Libya (Shareia, 2014).. 
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included in a special register of those who are qualified and therefore authorized to audit 
banks.  
The third element identified by Perks (1993) is the publication of accounting information. 
For accountability to be discharged, accounting information has to be communicated to 
stakeholders. According to Laffan (2003), accountability is promoted by the publication 
of the information. As discussed above, the commercial law requires a company to 
prepare and publish its financial statements; Article (227) indicates the items which must 
be included in the balance sheet of a company. 
Although the above elements are basically required to ensure an effective accountability 
system, Perks (1993) acknowledges that in the real world accountability is often less than 
predicted. Therefore, a complete and effective accountability process cannot be assumed 
in Libya.  
Based on the above discussion, the auditor’s role within the accountability system should 
be clear; on one hand management has to provide financial information of good quality 
while the role of the external auditor is to provide assurance that the financial information 
is fair and true.  
For the purposes of this paper audit quality is defined as the ability of the auditor to 
detect and report on earnings management practices. It is acknowledged that this 
definition is somewhat restrictive but we would argue that it is consistent with the 
definition by DeAngelo.  It is also acknowledged that audit quality could be defined in a 
number of ways. It is, as mentioned earlier, a complex concept which could be differently 
perceived by different stakeholders. Different stakeholders have different views about 
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what audit quality refers to. Smith (2012) cited that stakeholders’ perceptions on audit 
quality will depend on their involvement level with the audit process. In the same 
context, Knechel et al. (2013, p. 386) stressed that stakeholders’ perceptions on audit 
quality are vary and largely dependent on “whose eyes one looks through” Users, for 
example, consider the absence of material misstatement as an indication for audit quality. 
Auditors, on the other hand, define audit quality as complying with all professional 
requirements. Similarly, regulators may perceive audit quality as being complying with 
both professional standards and legal requirements (Knechel et al., 2013). This paper 
seeks the perceptions of different stakeholders about audit quality, in particular, in 
relation to earnings management. 
And therefore the key focus of this paper is to examine the stakeholders’ perceptions as 
to whether the external auditor is able to provide good audit quality i.e. in being able to 
detect earnings management and potentially report on it. The paper also addresses 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the accountability of auditors themselves within the overall 
accountability of the LCBs, and their perceptions of the use made of auditors’ reports. 
Thus, the research questions can be formalized as follows: 
RQ1. How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the efficiency of the external auditor in 
relation to earnings management?  
RQ2. How do LCBs’ stakeholders perceive the accountability of the external auditor? 
RQ3. How do LCBs’ stakeholders perceive the use of the external auditor’s report? 
4. Research method  
“… there has been a great deal of research into earnings management motivations 
using statistical methods8; however, few studies have offered a critical 
understanding of these problems through a survey such as interviews or 
                                                 
8 See for example,  Corbella et al. (2015) employed two different measures of EM to test for audit quality 
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questionnaires and understanding the nature and problems of earning management 
practices is crucial in order for regulators to put an accurate interpretation on such 
findings” (Habbash and Alghamdi, 2015, p. 123). 
 
This paper adopts a qualitative approach by examining the perceptions of LCBs' 
stakeholders regarding the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings 
management. It is hoped that this approach can help to address the identified lack of 
qualitative research on earnings management relative to that which has been quantitative 
in nature. The paper also seeks to provide insightful information for various stakeholders, 
in addition to the regulators mentioned by Habbash and Alghamdi (2015). 
Consistent with Habbash and Alghamdi (2015) who use both questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews to address earnings management practices in Saudi Arabia, this 
paper benefited from combining the two methods to explore the role of the external 
auditor in relation to the practice of earnings management by LCBs.  
In the first stage, 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted through which 
stakeholders’ views were sought about the external auditor’s ability to detect and prevent 
earnings management practices. The interviewees were selected on the basis that they 
possessed the knowledge and the experience to contribute to the research. Interviewees 
have been divided into four groups, namely: Preparers (PR); Auditors (AD); Regulators 
(RG); and Users (US). Some interviewees hold more than one position; for example, PR5 
is a bank chairman, external auditor and academic. 
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Table 1: Interviewee Groups 
Group Position Qualification Location 
Preparers 
PR1 Chairman  Msc Commercial bank 
PR2 Head of Correspondent Banking Office Msc Commercial bank 
PR3 Member of BoD  PhD Commercial bank 
PR4 Head of Accounting Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR5 Chairman  PhD Commercial bank 
PR6 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR7 Head of Accounts Preparing Dept. BSc Commercial bank 
PR8 Head of Correspondent Banking  BSc Commercial bank 
PR9 
Vice Manager of Eastern Branches 
Management 
Primary 
School 
Commercial bank 
PR10 Head of Finance and Control Msc Commercial bank 
PR11 Head of Financial Management BSc Commercial bank 
PR12 Assistant Manager of Accounting Dept. Diploma Commercial bank 
Auditors 
AD1 Auditor BSc Audit firm 
AD2 Auditor Msc Audit firm 
AD3 Senior Partner  PhD Audit firm 
AD4 Managing Partner BSc Audit firm 
Regulators 
RG1 Chief of Benghazi Branch  Msc LAAA 
RG2 Inspector of commercial banks BSc CBL 
RG3 Inspector of commercial banks Msc CBL 
RG4 Banking Exchange Control Dept. BSc CBL 
RG5 
Governor Deputy of CBL (Benghazi 
branch) 
Msc CBL 
RG6 Vice General Manager BSc Tax Authority 
RG7 Head of Listing and Follow-up Dept. BSc LSM 
RG8 Head of Internal Audit BSc LSM 
RG9 
Manager of Surveillance & Follow-up 
Risks Dept. 
Msc LSM 
RG10 Legal Consultant BSc Commercial bank 
Users 
US1 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. 
US2 Lecturer PhD Benghazi Uni. 
Key:  PR= Preparer, RG= Regulator, AD= Auditor, US= Users. BoD= Board of Directors, LAAA= the 
Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association, CBL= Central Bank of Libya, and LSM= Libyan Stock 
Market. 
The second research method used was a questionnaire survey. This was undertaken in the 
period early January 2013 till February 2013 during which time 193 copies were given to 
various stakeholders of the Libyan Commercial Banks.  
Table 2 summarizes the number of returned questionnaires categorized by different 
stakeholders. 
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Table 2: The Returned Questionnaires 
Respondent Groups 
Returned 
Questionnaires 
Response Rate 
Preparers 27 48% 
Auditors  27 50% 
Regulators 20 64% 
Users  28 54% 
Total 102 53% 
 
The total proportions of each individual group (Preparers, Auditors, Regulators, and 
Users) are 26.5%, 26.5%, 19.6%, and 27.5% respectively; most are male (90 out of 102 
or 88.2%). Twenty eight (27.5%) are professionally qualified, mainly being members of 
the Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association (LAAA) (24 or 23.5%). Ninety 
(88.2%) of the respondents have an academic qualification higher than a Diploma which 
suggests a good basic knowledge of financial issues. Most importantly, 78 (76.5%) of the 
respondents have indicated that they have banking experience which again gives a 
reasonable level of assurance as regards obtaining informed views about Libyan 
commercial banks  (LCBs). 
Once the responses were coded into an Excel spreadsheet, the data was transferred to the 
SPSS statistical package for analysis. This study focuses on different stakeholders’ 
perceptions regarding the role of the external auditor in relation to earnings management 
practices in Libyan Commercial Banks; for this purpose, most questions were designed 
based on a five-point Likert scale.   
Therefore, non-parametric tests were employed in this study, in particular the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) and Mann-Whitney (MW) tests. The KW test is used to identify whether 
any significant difference exists among the perceptions of the groups; if so, a MW test is 
carried out to determine which pairs of groups show significantly different perceptions. 
17
  
For further illustration, descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations9, were also 
calculated to provide more insightful pictures of the perceptions. 
As previously reported, the majority of the questions were based on 5-point Likert scales 
ranging from (1) strongly disagree (SD) to (5) strongly agree (SA). The findings 
discussion will be restricted only to those which have p-values of 0.05 or under. 
5. Research findings  
5.1 Interview Findings about the Role of the External Auditor 
Initially interviewees were asked whether, and to what extent, they thought that the 
auditor is able to detect and prevent managers from being involved in earnings 
management. 25 (89%) of interviewees believe that the external auditor has the ability to 
detect the practice of earnings management, but only 7  (25%) think that the external 
audit does deter it. 
All Preparers are in agreement about the external auditor’s ability to detect earnings 
management but their views in respect of whether the external auditor can deter the 
practice of earnings management showed almost equal results; 5 of them believe that the 
external auditor can deter it while 6 Preparers hold the opposite view that they cannot 
deter it. All Auditors who have answered this question said that the external auditor can 
detect the practices of earnings management but will be unable to deter it. The majority 
of Regulators (9 out of 10) think that the external auditor can detect earnings 
management practices but only 2 (out 9 who believe he/she can detect) think that the 
external auditor can deter earnings management. The only User who answered this 
                                                 
9 Means and standard deviations are, strictly speaking, not appropriate as measures of ordinal data, but their 
use is widespread and they arguably have reasonable information content subject to assumptions made 
about the intervals in the ordinal data. 
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question gave the view that the external auditor is able to detect earnings management but 
is unable to deter it. 
PR1, for instance, suggested that the auditor is able to prevent through his opinion and 
can detect the earnings management practices. On the other hand, the ability to prevent 
such a practice apparently is affected by a number of factors as will be discussed later. 
The majority of interviewees (89%) agreed that the external auditor can detect earnings 
management if he/she is qualified. As for preventing earnings management, responses 
come in different ways. Some say that he can prevent it through ‘waving’10 his/her report 
and some say that he cannot prevent it for some reasons. PR4, for example, mentioned 
the fees amount that an auditor may lose in case of any conflict with management. He 
said: 
"The auditor is supposed to be qualified to detect it through the process of 
audit. It depends on his personality if he is not caring about the money he 
would say “no”. But actually most of them say ok. Our fees have reached 
50,000 LD". 
External auditor efficiency, which is a central issue within the accountability mechanism, 
is seen to be compromised by the high audit fees commercial banks usually pay and also 
the personality of the individual external auditor.  Ironically, the external audit represents 
a very important element in the accountability process which theoretically should be 
enhanced by the payment of high fees to reflect rigorous and high quality audits. Those 
high fees themselves could, however, harm accountability due to the threat of financial 
dependence. 
                                                 
10 Threatening that he/she may issue a qualified opinion. 
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Also, interviewees perceived that an auditors' experience plays a significant role in 
detecting earnings management practices. In the first year of an audit, auditors may not 
be experienced enough in relation to understanding the new client’s business to detect 
earnings management as expressed by PR5 and PR12 who respectively said: 
"It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for 
five years for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to 
reduce the practice". 
"External auditor in his first time of auditing will not be able to detect it. But 
if he discovered he can prevent it". 
The notion of audit tenure11 was also mentioned in the response of PR10 who also 
blamed limited audit samples for not uncovering earnings management practices. 
"To some extent, the external auditor can detect earnings management, but 
only to some extent as he will take samples. He will not be able to audit all 
transactions. When he detects the earnings management, it is supposed that 
he has the power to prevent it. Due to the limited number of auditors who 
are qualified to audit big institutions, the more the auditor becomes familiar 
with the institution the more the auditor creates a kind of relation with the 
institution that makes the auditor work for the management instead of 
shareholders". 
The audit process itself could be seen, as in above quotation, as one of the factors that 
could affect the detection of earnings management practices. This was also stressed by 
US1, who considered the problem of audit samples by saying: 
"Yes, the auditor can discover it. But not all earnings management practices 
because of audit samples. The auditor is one of the tools to discover 
earnings management practices. The auditor needs standards, and 
professional management in order to be able to discover, also has to be 
qualified. This is a big question that cannot be answered easily; auditor has 
to be protected when appointed and when terminated. He has to have 
standards to be applied". 
                                                 
11 According to the CBL’s regulation, an auditor can only be assigned for maximum two years for the same 
bank. However, the appointment may be renewed after a one year audit by another auditor.  
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Auditor independence represents a core element in the audit function and thus in the 
accountability process. AD1 described the relation between auditors and management by 
saying: 
"Auditor assignment is 90% or 99% dependent on personal contacts so an 
auditor’s decision is consistent with the management's desire”.  
In the same vein, RG1, when asked to rate the efficiency of listed auditors, mentioned the 
problem of personal contacts in appointing the external auditor. He said: 
"Not all of them are at the same level of efficiency. Some audit assignments 
are based on personal contacts and are regardless of the effectiveness or 
efficiency". 
The accountability process can be seen as less effective once an auditor’s independence is 
compromised; therefore more efforts have to be taken in order to enhance auditor 
independence. 
AD3 commented: 
"If he was capable he would detect it. The profession is suffering. In Libya 
there is a problem unfortunately; industry got a lot of unqualified auditors 
meanwhile a lot of qualified people as well. The market and life 
circumstances play a role in making auditors give up (no resistance) to the 
management. I know and you know there are some auditors who only have 
one client and he is not braced for losing it". 
The profession itself could contribute to an auditor’s ability to detect and prevent 
earnings management practices. For example, PR3 has said: 
"Most external auditors don’t prevent the practice of earnings management. 
The audit function is traditional in Libya". 
This suggests that the improvement of the entire profession (which arguably could start 
with the setting of accounting standards) is needed in order to back accounting practices 
and therefore facilitate the audit function. In other words, the conceptual framework 
would empower the accountability process. 
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PR10 also commented on this issue in assessing the listed auditors’ efficiency by saying: 
"They have the experience in banks audit. They have the ability. But they 
are a bit traditional, they are not following the technology". 
Earnings management itself could be the reason why auditors cannot detect or prevent it. 
RG8 commented: 
"Well it is a new topic and most auditors have no idea about it so I think 
they cannot detect if. On the other hand, the independence of the auditor is 
all the time questionable". 
The external auditor plays a crucial role in the accountability relationship; his/her role is 
to give assurance and confidence that financial statements faithfully represent the 
financial situation of the firm. This role may be impaired by some factors, as interview 
findings reveal a view that the external auditor’s effectiveness may be affected by 
knowledge, experience, conflict of interest (fees, tenure) and audit procedures and 
sampling. Therefore, and based on interview findings, the external auditor’s effectiveness 
is questionable and therefore accountability would be judged as being breached. 
Moreover, the interview findings reported earlier suggests that 89% of interviewees 
acknowledge the ability of the external auditor in detecting earnings management 
practices, but only 25% of interviewees believe that the external auditor is able to play a 
role in deterring LCBs managers from being engaged in earnings management. This 
suggests that accountability is to some extent affected by the personality of the external 
auditor that was suggested by PR4 when he was speaking about the high fees for bank 
audits. 
Interviewees' views about the ability and efficiency of auditors who are listed at the CBL 
and thereby authorised to audit banks were also explored. Some interviewees accept that 
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most of those listed auditors have the capability to audit banks while others were more 
sceptical. 
PR1 has stated: 
"It is a very good question. Only those who have audited banks and got the 
experience. Not all of them are qualified to audit banks". 
This might lead to the question of what standards does the CBL follow in listing external 
auditors. PR3 raised this query: 
"The auditors who are listed and authorised to audit banks, I am not 
convinced about them, because there are no standards to accept the auditor 
and licence him to audit banks".  
Interviewees were also asked to determine the extent to which the auditor's report is used 
by various stakeholders. Libyan stakeholders may lack the culture and tradition of 
reading the reports as declared by RG1 who said: 
"Some ways of manipulation are easy to detect but giving a qualified 
opinion is not enough because of inaccuracy of the auditor’s report on one 
hand. On the hand there is no report reading culture by interested parties... 
the use of the auditor report is very limited and in most cases is informal". 
RG5 thinks that the auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and that no one is using it. 
He said: 
"There is no relying on it at all. It is only a legal requirement". 
RG9 also suggested: 
"Unfortunately it is a legal requirement by the LSM and I don’t think people 
are interested in it". 
Interviewees view the CBL, LSM, tax authorities and management as the stakeholders 
who are most interested in the auditor's report. PR1 added correspondent banks as 
another party which is interested in the external auditor's report. He also commented on 
investors' use of the auditor's report. He said it was: 
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"Supposed to be very important for the CBL and the LSM and 
correspondents are very interested in the auditor's report. Investors are not, 
as they depend on their broker when deciding on buying or selling shares". 
According to, PR4, no one is using the auditor’s report. He noticed: 
"Supposed to depend on it, but I don’t think they do use it here". 
The auditor’s reputation may be an important factor in a report’s use. PR11 stressed the 
good reputation of the auditor. He stated: 
"The owners are much more interested in the detailed report12 rather than an 
opinion report. Also the auditor himself plays an important role for example 
a report signed by one auditor, for example, will be accepted by the tax 
authority with no suspicion, on the other hand another auditor's report could 
be thrown away". 
For AD4 only foreign companies are interested in the auditor's report while the local 
authorities only ask for it as a legal requirement. He observed: 
"Frankly no one uses it [the auditor’s report] except the foreign companies 
who send it to their head offices in order to make the consolidated 
statements. In Libya they use it as a legal requirement only. One time in a 
general assembly meeting the auditor was not invited to read his report". 
As understood, the main functions of the external auditor are to examine the financial 
statements and to provide an opinion based on that examination. In other words, the 
external auditor’s role within the accountability system is fulfilled when the external 
auditor’s report is issued. In the case that this report is not being used, the accountability 
system may not be fully implemented. It could also reflect lack of awareness by various 
stakeholders about the accountability system in general and the role of the external 
auditor in the accountability process in particular. 
                                                 
12 There are, in Libya, two reports an auditor has to submit to the general assembly; a detailed report which 
normally consists of auditor’s remarks on the internal control system and any mistaken transactions, the 
other is the opinion report. 
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5.2 Questionnaire Results about the relationship between Earnings Management 
and the External Auditor 
5.2.1 Perceptions about the Effectiveness of the External Auditor  
As mentioned earlier, only specifically listed auditors are permitted to conduct an audit of 
banks. This requirement would imply that listed auditors are of high qualifications and 
experience, and thereby are effective and able to prevent or at least deter bank managers 
from being involved in earnings management practices. Stakeholders were asked to 
assess the capability of listed auditors for auditing banks and how able they are to deter 
and prevent earnings management. The use of the auditor’s report in helping interested 
parties assess the bank’s financial performance was also examined. In addition, a 
question addressed views as to whether the auditor’s reporting is being used by the 
auditor to deter or prevent the practice of earnings management. The results are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency (K-W test) 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
1 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well 
qualified and capable to audit banks 
102 3.18 1.066 3.30 3.11 3.20 3.11 .860 
2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon 
when assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
102 3.69 .844 3.85 3.37 3.65 3.86 .074 
3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect and 
deter earnings management practices 
in LCBs 
102 3.37 .943 3.52 3.26 3.55 3.21 .523 
4 
An auditor’s ability to report on 
earnings management is compromised 
by audit fees 
102 2.98 .975 2.96 2.70 3.00 3.25 .253 
5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest to 
an auditor’s independence 
102 3.09 .902 2.96 3.07 3.00 3.29 .519 
6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management using 
the power of the auditor’s report 
99 3.53 .849 3.81 3.12 3.58 3.61 .025* 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the external auditor’s efficiency. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) 
for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
As shown in Table 3, the mean scores indicate that stakeholders groups agreed to most of 
the questions. Listed auditors, according to stakeholders groups, were viewed as qualified 
and capable of performing banks’ audits with an average mean of 3.18. It is worth noting 
that some of the interview findings suggested that at least not all of the listed auditors are 
perceived as well qualified and able to audit banks due to experience discrepancies 
among listed auditors as per, for example, PR5: 
“It depends on what is the experience of the auditor in terms of time; an 
auditor for one year could not, but an auditor who has being auditing for 
five year for instance could detect and can give some advice on how to 
reduce the practice”. 
The stakeholder groups agreed, on balance, also that the auditor’s report is being used to 
help assess the financial performance of banks which again is unexpected and is in 
conflict with some of the interview findings that suggest auditors’ reports are only a legal 
requirement and nearly ignored in the decision making process.  
In keeping with the first finding in this table, stakeholders agreed on balance that listed 
auditors are able to detect and deter earnings management practices by LCBs which may 
indicate that this ability is not compromised by any factor i.e. audit fees. However, 
stakeholder groups disagreed, on balance, that audit fees affect the auditor’s ability to 
report on earnings management, the overall mean score is 2.92. This result is in contrast 
to some views expressed in the interviews; for example, one of the interview findings 
offered by PR4 suggests that bank audit fees may affect the external auditor’s ability to 
report about earnings management practices by LCBs. 
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The relative disagreement regarding audit fees’ impact on an auditor’s ability to report on 
earnings management could be partially due to the fact that the Auditors group tends, 
more than others, to disagree with this statement by giving the least mean score of 2.70. 
Given the questionnaire responses reported by Auditors only, it is clear the general 
attitude of Auditors tends to the disagreement side. The Auditors have shown 4 strongly 
disagree individual responses, the most compared to other groups, and 7 disagreements. 
However, due to the sensitivity of such a question, this may be influenced by their desire 
to appear not compromised by audit fees. Preparers’ responses are spread equally; 10, on 
the side of disagreement, including 2 strongly disagrees, and 10 on the side of agreement, 
including 1 strongly agree. 
Stakeholder groups have shown, on balance, a perception that an auditor’s willingness to 
report about earnings management is affected by conflict of interest and thereby auditor’s 
independence is compromised. In other words, there are some perceptions that reporting 
about earnings management breaches may lead to termination of an appointment which 
would affect the auditor decision, and thus his/her independence is compromised. The 
last question asked about the external auditor’s ability to prevent earnings management 
practices just by the power of the audit report. In other words, if bank managers did not 
adjust the reported income to undo the earnings management practices according to the 
external auditor’s notes, a qualified opinion will be given by the auditor. Stakeholder 
groups agreed, on balance, the effective power of the auditor’s report. Needless to say no 
single client would be happy to receive a qualified report. 
The perceptions of questionnaire respondents are broadly in line those of the interviews 
as reported in Section 5.1 regarding the ability of the external auditor in detecting the 
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earnings management. On balance, there is agreement by questionnaire respondents’ 
regarding the ability of the external auditor to both detect and deter earnings management 
practices. The mean score for this question was 3.37 (Q 3). In a more specific question 
regarding the ability of the external auditor to prevent earnings management practices (Q 
6), respondents, on average, apparently agree that the external auditor is able to deter 
such behaviour, moreover this can be achieved through the power of the external 
auditor’s report. However, the interview findings reported earlier refer to a contradictory 
view which is that the external auditor is able to detect the practice of earnings 
management, but, as for deterring this practice, only 25% of interviewees think that the 
external auditor is able to do that. 
It has previously been found, see, for example, Smith (2012) and Knechel et al. (2013), 
that different stakeholders can have different views on audit quality. Consistent with such 
findings, the results reported in Table 3, while showing wide agreement between 
stakeholder groups, show that Users are more doubtful of the ability of auditors to report 
on EM due to audit fees as well as a perceived conflict of interest. It is also worth noting 
that the Auditors group showed less confidence, for example when compared to the Users 
group, about audit quality. Notwithstanding the reservations apparently held by users 
regarding audit fees and conflicts of interest, the results show that, in general, regulators 
and preparers, as well as users in some cases, have more confidence in the effectiveness 
of the audit function than do auditors themselves.   It could be that the mandated 
requirements of the Central Bank of Libya for listed auditors could have a bearing on 
stakeholders’ perceptions. This may contribute to a view that listed auditors are well 
qualified and positioned in a way that enables them to provide high audit quality. On the 
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other hand, the more modest views of auditors themselves about their effectiveness could 
potentially refer to the challenges and difficulties experienced by auditors of which other 
stakeholders are less aware. 
The results articulated in Table 3 reveal only one significant difference; therefore, a 
Mann-Whitney test was implemented to identify which pairs have conflicting views. The 
results of these tests are presented in Table 4. 
Table 4: Stakeholders’ Perceptions about External Auditors Efficiency:  M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well 
qualified and capable to audit banks 
.860 .481 .714 .533 .564 .905 .798 
2 
The auditor’s report is relied upon 
when assessing a bank’s financial 
performance 
.074 .032* .262 .972 .265 .037* .290 
3 
Listed auditors are likely to detect 
and deter earnings management 
practices in LCBs 
.523 .305 .987 .268 .374 .816 .280 
4 
An auditor’s ability to detect 
earnings management is 
compromised by audit fees 
.253 .386 1.000 .335 .278 .057 .249 
5 
An auditor’s willingness to report 
earnings management breaches is 
compromised by conflict of interest 
to an auditor’s independence 
.519 .554 .836 .213 .553 .488 .209 
6 
The external auditor can prevent the 
practice of earnings management 
using the power of the auditor’s 
report 
.025* .005* .246 .420 .054 .042* .783 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding 
questions about the external auditor’s efficiency. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
Although one significant difference resulted from the KW test, four significant 
differences appeared when the MW tests were performed. The first resulted between the 
Preparers and Auditors groups regarding the use of the external auditor’s report, it can be 
seen from Table 4 that both groups agreed to reliance being placed on the auditor’s report 
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in the financial decision making process. Also, Preparers and Users groups seemingly 
have a conflict of views in this respect as the MW test results in a significant difference 
between them (.037). The Preparers and Auditors again show a significant difference in 
connection with the influence of the external auditor’s report in preventing earnings 
management practices, and there was also a significant difference between Preparers and 
Users regarding the same question. However, all groups’ means reveal an aggregate level 
of agreement with the last question. 
The implications of the results reported above in Tables 3 and 4 on the accountability 
process stem basically from the importance of the role of the external auditor within the 
accountability process. This role relies mainly on the qualification and independence of 
the external auditor. If these qualities are in question then so will be the external audit 
efficiency resulting in impaired accountability of LCBs. The next section discusses, in 
addition to the use of the external auditor’s report, whether the external auditor is aware 
of his/her accountability towards stakeholders other than shareholders. 
5.2.2 Perceptions about External Auditor Accountability 
This section examined perceptions of different stakeholders concerning the external 
auditor’s awareness of his/her own accountability. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their agreement or disagreement as to whether external auditors are aware of their 
responsibility towards shareholders and other parties who may make a decision based on 
the external auditor’s report. The section also surveyed perceptions of the use of the 
external auditor’s report by stakeholders. Finally, the section also examined one of the 
points made by an interviewee that the external auditor’s report is only a legal 
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requirement and that it is not used in the financial decision making process. The results 
are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used: K-W test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
1 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the shareholders 
98 3.46 1.047 3.64 3.64 3.80 3.07 .074 
2 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the third parties 
97 3.33 .898 3.56 3.56 3.47 3.04 .128 
3 
The auditor’s report is widely used by 
interested stakeholders 
98 3.46 .864 3.80 3.80 3.65 3.14 .040* 
4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in the 
financial decision making process 
98 2.85 1.068 2.52 2.52 2.70 3.00 .223 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value 
for the Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), 
and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
Table 5 shows the overall mean responses for these questions. The average responses 
indicate that, overall, stakeholders groups agree that the external auditor is mindful of 
his/her responsibility and accountability not only to shareholders but beyond; the results 
also reveal that external auditors are aware of their accountability to third parties. The 
average means were 3.46 and 3.33 respectively. Stakeholder groups also agreed that the 
auditor’s report is widely used by interested stakeholders in the decision making process 
with a mean score of 3.46, and, unexpectedly, refuted the notion that the auditor’s report 
is only a legal requirement and not widely used in financial decision making. This result 
is at variance with the interview findings reported earlier as some interviewees indicated 
that the external auditor’s report is not widely used. RG5, for example, stated that “There 
is no relying on it [the auditor’s report] at all. It is only a legal requirement”.  
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The K-W test points out a significant difference amongst the groups regarding the use of 
the external auditor’s report by interested stakeholders. To identify which pairs have 
significantly differing viewpoints, M-W test was performed and the results are shown in 
Table 6. 
Table 6: The External Auditor’s Accountability and the Extent to Which His/Her 
Report is used: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the 
shareholders 
.074 .496 .549 .040* .243 .215 .024* 
2 
External auditors are fully aware of 
their accountability to the third 
parties 
.128 .290 .562 .027* .665 .228 .113 
3 
The auditor’s report is widely used 
by interested stakeholders 
.040* .043* .627 .012* .209 .507 .085 
4 
The auditor’s report is only a legal 
requirement and not used widely in 
the financial decision making 
process 
.223 .052 .550 .172 .191 .734 .437 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding 
questions about the auditor’s accountability and his report extent. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), 
auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 
5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results shown in Table 6 show a number of significant differences. Preparers and 
Users groups have shown different views regarding the auditors’ awareness of their 
accountability towards shareholders; although both agreed with the statement on balance 
as their mean scores in Table 5 indicate (although the Users group’s agreement is only 
slightly above the mid-point being 3.07). Regulators and Users have also shown a 
disagreement regarding this question. The second statement has a significant difference 
between Preparers and Users, who have generated mean scores of 3.56 and 3.04 
respectively, it is notable that the Preparers’ mean is the highest while the Users is the 
lowest. 
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Although Preparer and Auditor groups generated the same mean score of 3.80 regarding 
the use of the auditor’s report by stakeholders, M-W results reveal a significant difference 
between these two groups towards this statement. The M-W results also show a 
significant difference for this statement between preparers and users groups whose mean 
scores are 3.80 and 3.41 respectively.  
5.2.3 Perceptions about the Use of the External Auditor’s Report by Various 
Stakeholders 
The use of the auditor’s report has been discussed earlier; this section reports, in 
particular, which stakeholders are perceived to be using the external auditor’s report. 
Respondents were asked to assess the use of the external auditor’s report by a certain list 
of stakeholders. The listed stakeholders have been partially mentioned in the interviews, 
others are drawn from the literature. However, the results shown in Tables 7 and 8 reveal 
no significant differences and the respondent groups all agreed (on aggregate) and with 
different levels, that the auditor’s report is being used by these stakeholders.  
Table 7: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders: K-W Test 
Q Statement N Mean SD 
Group Means K-W 
P-value PR AD RG US 
1 Shareholders 99 3.88 .848 4.04 3.72 3.90 3.86 .487 
2 Management 99 3.70 .963 3.85 3.40 3.95 3.64 .304 
3 Employees 98 3.22 .914 3.36 3.08 3.45 3.07 .475 
4 Tax authority 98 3.76 .909 3.96 3.58 3.80 3.68 .531 
5 Current and potential customers 96 3.49 .962 3.58 3.52 3.47 3.39 .864 
6 The Libyan Stock Market  98 4.02 .786 3.92 3.88 4.10 4.18 .309 
7 Central Bank of Libya 99 4.09 .771 4.15 3.96 4.00 4.21 .376 
8 Corresponding banks 96 3.64 .964 3.58 3.60 3.75 3.63 .989 
9 Media 97 3.27 1.005 3.25 3.28 3.45 3.14 .825 
10 Academia and research centres 98 3.43 .952 3.48 3.44 3.70 3.18 .359 
11 Society as a whole 97 3.24 .966 3.42 3.24 3.40 2.96 .411 
Note: This table shows the mean and standard deviation (SD) for all respondents regarding questions about 
who use the auditor’s report. It also provides the mean for each group and the p-value for the Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) test. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), regulators (RG), and users (US) 
for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
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As the results in Table 7 suggest, no significant differences appeared from the K-W test. 
This is also supported by the mean scores all being above 3 which  indicates, 
unexpectedly, a view that all listed stakeholders, on balance, and on aggregate, are using 
the external auditor’s report. However, The Central Bank of Libya and the Libyan Stock 
Market are the users for whom there is strongest agreement that they use the external 
auditor’s report with mean scores of 4.09 and 4.02 respectively. On the other hand, 
Employees have been indicated as users of the external auditor’s report with the lowest 
mean score of 3.22. 
Table 8: The External Auditor’s Report Use by Various Stakeholders: M-W test 
Q Statement 
K-W 
P-values 
M-W p-values 
PR-AD PR-RG PR-US AD-RG AD-US RG-US 
1 Shareholders .487 .148 .546 .460 .430 .416 1.000 
2 Management .304 .118 .704 .675 .076 .345 .445 
3 Employees .475 .336 .860 .305 .250 .895 .217 
4 Tax authority .531 .103 .438 .551 .479 .563 .893 
5 Current and potential customers .864 .537 .405 .566 .721 .841 1.000 
6 The Libyan Stock Market  .309 .630 .685 .225 .356 .101 .398 
7 Central Bank of Libya .376 .328 .570 .413 .815 .137 .259 
8 Corresponding banks .989 .709 .949 .996 .789 .875 .773 
9 Media .825 .936 .604 .681 .560 .644 .395 
10 Academia and research centres .359 .809 .374 .302 .287 .390 .119 
11 Society as a whole .411 .484 .999 .155 .568 .359 .205 
Note: This table shows the p-values produced by M-W test between the different groups regarding 
questions about who use the auditor’s report. Groups are defined as; preparers (PR), auditors (AD), 
regulators (RG), and users (US) for each question. Bold figure indicates significance at the 5% level. 
A 5-point Likert scale was used in these questions. It ranged from 1= “Strongly disagree” to 5= “Strongly 
agree”. 
 
The results in Table 8 point out no significant differences between any two groups in 
respect of the using of the auditor’s report by the various stakeholders. These results 
indicate, on balance, wide use of the external auditor’s report by shareholders and other 
stakeholders. 
34
  
6. Summary and Conclusion  
The external auditor represents a key element in the accountability mechanism. Their 
important role, providing assurance and improving the credibility of the financial 
statements, increases public confidence in respect of the reliability and relevance of the 
provided financial information i.e. by providing an audit of good quality. It arguably can 
be said that a good quality audit would reduce or prevent earnings management practices 
thus helping to provide financial information which would be of good quality and 
ultimately one can argue good audit quality has a crucial role in promoting the 
accountability system. As mentioned earlier, only registered auditors with the CBL are 
authorised to perform the audit of banks which implies a certain level of audit quality is 
required by the CBL. Based on this one could have a reasonable expectation that good 
quality audits are  being carried out in LCBs and therefore LCBs’ financial reporting is of 
a reasonable level of quality i.e. unbiased accounting information is being provided. 
Interviewees were asked to assess the role of the external auditor in respect of earnings 
management by LCBs’ managers. Although they expressed the view that registered 
auditors are able to detect earnings management practices of LCBs, they were doubtful, 
for various reasons about the ability of the external auditor when it comes to preventing 
or deterring the practices. 89% of interviewees had the view that the auditor is able to 
detect earnings management but 75% of them thought that the auditor is unable to 
prevent such a practice. Some other issues were referred to as reducing the external 
auditor’s ability to detect or prevent earnings management, these were: lack of 
knowledge, limited experience, conflict of interest, and audit sampling. The 
accountability then can be perceived as being compromised given the perceived inability 
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of the external auditor to both detect and prevent earnings management and as a 
consequence the audit function is being provided at a low level of quality. 
Based on such a finding one can argue that LCBs’ stakeholders have reduced trust13 in 
the auditing profession. It could also be inferred that LCBs’ are basing their decisions on 
other sources rather than audited financial statements. This would be in line with Malsch 
and Gendron (2009) who found that investment decisions are being taken based on the 
quality of management rather than the content of financial statements.  Financial analysts 
may be thought to behave as though they rely on auditors and depend on audit quality as 
being crucial to their daily business. However this collective imagery may not reflect the 
reality. According to Malsch and Gendron (2009), the assessment of management 
integrity and competencies is a more important basis on which investment decisions are 
made. 
The role of the external auditor was examined in more detail by the questionnaire survey. 
The external audit function is related to the accounting standards as it is part of the 
auditor’s job to ensure financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the 
adopted framework i.e. accounting standards. Previous literature reports that the lack of 
accounting standards in Libya would make such a mission a challenging task in many 
aspects: lack of a framework leads to financial information being unstable, the accounting 
practices applied in one year may not be applied in the next period or it may happen that 
two banks apply different practices. In addition, the verifiability characteristic would not 
be an easy task, absence of accounting standards could lead to different outcomes if 
                                                 
13 Trust can broadly be defined as “a mechanism that can reduce uncertainty in context of interaction and 
facilitate the functioning of organizational systems” (Malsch and Gendron, 2009, p. 739). 
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financial information were to be produced by another accountant. The lack of accounting 
standards may also open the door for managers to apply any accounting practice that 
serves their own benefit and present the financial statements in a favourable position to 
their stakeholders. To sum up, it could be argued that deficient, or lack of, standards leads 
to a deficient audit function. 
The questionnaire results showed, on balance, agreement by LCBs’ stakeholders that the 
ineffective function of the external audit, as well as the difficulty of detecting earnings 
management by auditors may be reasons why earnings management is taking place in 
LCBs’ financial reporting.  
Another result revealed stakeholders’ agreement that educating the external auditor may 
have a positive impact on the external auditor’s ability to deter earnings management 
behaviour. This result led to the inference that listed auditors are not trained and educated 
well enough to detect the behaviour. Moreover, the questionnaire results reveal that listed 
auditors are relatively (on balance) in a good position that enables them to detect and 
deter earnings management practices of LCBs’ managers. This finding is consistent with 
a number of findings in the literature which give support to audit specialization. e.g 
Krishnan (2003), Dunn and Mayhew (2004), Lowensohn et al. (2007), and Bruynseels et 
al., (2011) who concluded that specialized auditors are more likely to detect errors in 
financial statements than non-specialist auditors. Similarly, our findings are consistent 
with, for example, Kramer et al. (2011) and Kim et al. (2015) regarding the positive 
effect of audit firm rotation on audit quality. Also, the paper has provided evidence that 
audit quality may be perceived differently by different stakeholders as found by, for 
example, Smith (2012) and Knechel et al. (2013).The sanction through which auditors are 
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able to deter earnings management practices, according to the questionnaire results, is the 
auditor’s report. In this context another difference arose between the interview findings 
and the questionnaire results. Interviewees had the view that listed auditors are unable to 
deter earnings management practices referring to some issues to support this notion, e.g. 
audit fees and the lack of significance of the external auditor report since in some cases it 
is only regarded as a nominal legal requirement. On the other hand, questionnaire 
respondents agreed that the auditor’s report does deter the practice implying a more 
effective accountability process, through higher audit quality. 
Other issues were explored in the questionnaire regarding perceptions of the external 
auditor. LCBs’ stakeholders showed, on balance, agreement that the external auditor is 
aware of his/her accountability to shareholders and other parties and also that the 
auditor’s report is not only a legal requirement but is being widely used by various 
stakeholders contrary to most of the views expressed in the interviews. Specifically, the 
questionnaire results showed, on average, agreement that the auditor’s report is being 
used by: shareholders, management, employees, the tax authority, customers, the Libyan 
Stock Market, the CBL, corresponding banks, the media, academia, and society as a 
whole. 
Although the questionnaire results in many aspects show support for the current status of 
the bank audit function, in contrast to the interview findings, LCBs’ stakeholders did 
perceive a weakness in the regulatory regime.  They agreed, on balance, to the need to 
strengthen both audit regulation and oversight of financial reporting. This could be seen 
to imply that the accountability of LCBs does require additional tools in order to be 
enhanced. The institutional context of bank audits in Libya is regulated by more than 
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statutory legislation, it includes, for example, the CBL’s requirements for bank auditors’ 
qualifications and experience.  However, this may not be sufficient to provide good audit 
quality and therefore more measures may be required. This suggests that, to enhance the 
accountability process of LCBs, efforts should be made to enhance the audit function by 
strengthening it through legislation. Also, oversight of the financial reporting function, 
which does not exist at the moment, should be established so that the accountability 
system can be further enhanced. Literature findings on the weaknesses of the accounting 
profession in Libya can point to potential reasons for such an audit quality level. Further 
research can help to identity how the accounting profession in Libya can be improved. 
And as a result the accountability process could be strengthened not only within the 
banking industry, but in the wider economy. Gray et al. (2015) have highlighted the close 
relationship between audit and accountability and it seems clear that without a trusted 
audit function there will be a serious lack of accountability in terms of perception and of 
substance.   
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Appendix  
Questionnaire Survey 
 
Part 1 :General Information (Please respond by ticking (√) in the appropriate box) 
 
Please indicate your age 
Less than 25 years 
old 
Between 26 and 
30 years old 
Between 31 and 
40 years old 
Between 41 and 
50 years old 
Over 50 years old 
     
 
1.1 Please indicate your gender:  M (     ),   F (     ) 
 
2. Are you professionally qualified in accountancy or finance?  Yes (      )  No (      ) 
 
If yes, please indicate which of the following professional qualifications that you have: 
Professional Body  
LAAA  
ICAEW  
CIMA  
ACCA  
AICPA  
Other, please specify ….  
 
3. What is your highest educational qualification? 
Qualification  
Diploma  
Bachelor degree  
Master degree  
Doctorate  
Other, please specify ………  
 
4. Please indicate your place of education for your highest degree 
Place  
Libya  
Other Arab country  
UK  
USA  
Other, please specify ………  
 
5. Please tick your place of work and position 
Place of Work  position 
A commercial bank   
Central Bank of Libya   
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The Libyan Stock Market   
Tax Authority   
Audit Firm   
State Audit   
Current or potential investor   
Academia and Research Centres   
Other, please specify ………   
 
6. Please indicate the work experience, if any, that you have: 
Less than 5 years  Between 5 and 10 years  
Between 11 and 15 years  Over 15 years  
7. Where applicable, please describe any work experience that you have had in the Libyan 
banking sector (e.g. accountant for 5 years, internal auditor for 3 years)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
EM and Audit Quality 
 According to Libyan regulations, only auditors who are listed with the Central Bank of Libya are 
allowed to audit Libyan commercial banks. This restriction implies that those “listed auditors” 
are qualified to undertake an effective audit for banks. To what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements:  
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
Listed auditors, in practice, are well qualified and 
capable to audit banks 
     
The auditor’s report is relied upon when assessing a 
bank’s financial performance 
     
Listed auditors are likely to detect and deter earnings 
management practices in Libyan commercial banks 
     
An auditor’s ability to report on earnings management 
is compromised by audit fess 
     
An auditor’s willingness to report earnings 
management breaches  is compromised by confliction 
of interest to an auditor’s independence 
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The external auditor can prevent the practice of EM 
using the power of the auditor’s report 
     
 
3.2 Please indicate the extent by which you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Statement SD D NAD A SA 
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the shareholders 
     
External auditors are fully aware of their accountability 
to the third parties 
     
The auditor’s report is widely used by interested  
stakeholders 
     
The auditor’s report is only a legal requirement and not 
used widely in the financial decision making process. 
     
 
Presumably, an auditor’s report is used by several parties when making economic decisions 
regarding financial statements. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that the 
following stakeholders place greater trust in financial statements of Libyan commercial banks as 
a result of the auditor’s report than they would otherwise do: 
(Note: SD = strongly disagree, D= disagree, NAD= neither agree nor disagree, A= agree and, SA= 
strongly agree) 
Users SD D NAD A SA 
shareholders      
Management      
Employees      
Tax department      
Current and potential customers      
The Libyan Stock Market      
Central Bank of Libya      
Corresponding banks      
Media      
Academia and research centres      
Society as a whole      
Other, please specify ………………      
 
The researcher would like to take the opportunity to thank you for filling in the questionnaire. 
Also, if you would like to receive a summary of the research results and findings please write 
down your name and contact details. Thank you. 
 
Name  
Address  
Email  
Phone number  
Fax number  
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